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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff-Appellee, : Case No. 900267-CA 
v, : 
DAYTON J. ("ROCKY") BELGARD, : Priority No. 2 
Defendant-Appellant. : 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This is an appeal from a conviction of possession of a 
firearm by a restricted person, a third degree felony, in 
violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-503(2)(a) (1990), in the 
Third Judicial District Court in and for Salt Lake County, the 
Honorable Raymond S. Uno, presiding. This Court has jurisdiction 
to hear the appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(f) 
(Supp. 1990). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES ON APPEAL AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
The following issues are presented on appeal: 
1. Was the trial court's denial of defendant's motion 
to arrest judgment proper? Rule 23 of the Utah Rules of Criminal 
Procedure provides that the trial court may arrest judgment upon 
a showing of "good cause." Thus, the decision to grant or deny 
an arrest of judgment is a matter of discretion with the trial 
court and will not be reversed absent a clear abuse of that 
discretion. See State v. Smith, 776 P.2d 929, 933 (Utah Ct. App. 
1989); State v. Lairby, 699 P.2d 1187, 1203 (Utah 1984), 
overruled on other grounds, State v, John, 770 P.2d 994, 995 
(Utah 1989). 
2. Are the trial court's findings on various issues 
adequate for a meaningful review where the trial court did not 
make written findings of fact and its oral findings were sketchy? 
If this Court determines that the findings are not adequate to 
enable it to meaningfully review the issues on appeal, it may 
remand for more detailed findings. State v. Lovegren, 798 P.2d 
767, 771 (Utah Ct. App. 1990). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES 
Rule 12(b)(2), Utah Rules of Criminal 
Procedure 
Any defense, objection or request, including 
request for rulings on the admissibility of 
evidence, which is capable of determination 
without the trial of the general issue may be 
raised prior to trial by written motion. The 
following shall be raised at least five days 
prior to the trial. 
(2) motions concerning the admissibility 
of evidence[.] 
Rule 12(c), Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure 
A motion made before trial shall be 
determined before trial unless the court for 
good cause orders that the ruling be deferred 
for later determination. Where factual 
issues are involved in determining a motion, 
the court shall state its findings on the 
record. 
Rule 12(d), Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure 
Failure of the defendant to timely raise 
defenses or objections or to make requests 
which must be made prior to trial or at the 
time set by the court shall constitute waiver . 
thereof, but the court for cause shown may 
grant relief from such waiver. 
Rule 23, Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure 
At any time prior to the imposition of 
sentence, the court upon its own initiative 
may, or upon motion of a defendant shall, 
arrest judgment if the facts proved or 
admitted do not constitute a public offense, 
or the defendant is mentally ill, or there is 
other good cause for the arrest of judgment. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant, Dayton J. ("Rocky") Belgard, was charged 
with possession of a firearm by a restricted person, a third 
degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-503(2)(a) 
(1990) (Record [hereinafter "R."] at 7). Defendant was 
convicted after a bench trial on October 10, 1989 (R. 30). 
Defendant made a motion for a new trial which was denied in a 
minute entry (R. 51). Defendant subsequently filed a motion to 
arrest judgment which was also denied (R. 120). Defendant was 
sentenced May 2, 1990, to a term of not more than five years in 
the Utah State Prison with credit for time served (13 months) (R. 
123. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Defendant was convicted of possession of a firearm by 
a restricted person, a third degree felony, based on evidence 
seized by a police officer incident to a search of defendant's 
motel room. The record is devoid of any indication that 
defendant filed a motion to suppress the evidence against him 
either before or during trial. After he was convicted, defendant 
The 1990 amendment, effective April 23, 1990, inserted "or 
probation" and substituted "in a correctional facility" for "at 
the Utah state prison or other like facility" in Subsection 
(2)(a), substituted "but" for "and" in Subsection (2)(b), and 
made minor stylistic changes which do not affect the conviction 
here. 
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filed a new trial motion asserting that the evidence against him 
should have been suppressed (R. 32). The trial court denied that 
motion in a minute entry (R. 51; a copy of the minute entry 
denying defendant's motion for new trial is attached hereto as 
Addendum A). Defendant then filed a motion for the arrest of 
judgment asserting that the evidence against him was obtained in 
violation of his fourth amendment rights and principles of 
collateral estoppel (R. 60). An evidentiary hearing on the 
motion was held and the court heard testimony from officer Bruce 
Maxwell for the State and Kimberly Belgard for defendant (R. 73). 
Following the evidentiary hearing, both parties submitted 
memorandum (R. 74, State's memorandum; R. 91, defendant's 
memorandum). Defendant requested and the court granted a hearing 
for oral argument on the motion (R. 102). In denying defendant's 
motion to arrest judgment the trial court made the following oral 
findings: (1) the officer's knock on defendant's motel room door 
was comparable to a Terry stop, and (2) the handgun was in plain 
view on the bed (Transcript of arrest of judgment hearing, April 
16, 1990 [hereinafter "T3.M] at 12-14; a copy is attached hereto 
as addendum B). No written findings were issued (R. 120; a copy 
of the order denying an arrest of judgment is attached hereto as 
o 
Addendum C). 
2 
A review of the record is hampered by the mislabeling of the 
(1) State's Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Opposition to 
Motion to Suppress (R, 74); (2) defendant's Memorandum of Points 
and Authorities in Support of Defendant's Motion for Arrest of 
Judgment and for Suppression of Evidence (R. 91); and (3) the 
trial court's Order Denying Defendant's Motion for Arrest of 
Judgment and for Suppression of Evidence (R. 120). Although the 
above labels suggest that a motion to suppress was actually 
filed, as noted previously, the record is devoid of any 
-A-
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Defendant's allegation that the evidence against him 
was obtained pursuant to an unreasonable search and seizure in 
violation of his fourth amendment rights was not timely and 
should not be considered on appeal. There is no indication in 
the record that a motion to suppress was filed on behalf of 
defendant either before or during trial. Rather, the trial court 
was first made aware of defendant's objections to the 
admissibility of the evidence against him in the postverdict 
motions for new trial and arrest of judgment. Furthermore, the 
record does not indicate that the trial court's denial of 
defendant's motion to arrest judgment was an abuse of discretion; 
therefore, the denial of defendant's motion on the merits is not 
subject to reversal. 
Alternatively, should this Court determine that 
defendant's motion to arrest judgment was timely made, the 
failure of the trial court to issue adequate findings of fact 
will not allow this Court to meaningfully review the appellate 
issues. Therefore, this Court should remand this case for more 
detailed findings. 
2 
Cont. indication that a motion to suppress was ever filed on 
behalf of defendant in this case. 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
DEFENDANT'S SUPPRESSION CLAIM WAS NOT TIMELY 
AND SHOULD NOT BE CONSIDERED ON APPEAL** 
As noted previously, a review of the record below is 
somewhat hampered by the mislabeling of several documents. 
Therefore, it is important at the outset of the State's analysis 
to clarify the record on appeal. Defendant was convicted after a 
bench trial of possession of a firearm by a restricted person (R. 
30). Rather than appealing his conviction, defendant filed a 
motion for new trial asserting (1) that he was denied the 
effective assistance of counsel because his trial counsel did not 
move to suppress the evidence prior to trial and (2) that the 
evidence against him was incredible and/or insufficient. 
Following a hearing on the motion, the trial court denied the 
defendant's new trial motion in a minute entry (R. 51; see 
Addendum A). Defendant did not appeal the trial court's ruling, 
electing to file a motion to arrest judgment instead (R. 60). In 
support of his motion to arrest judgment, defendant raised 
substantially the same argument as in his new trial motion with 
the exception that he did not argue that he was denied the 
effective assistance of counsel. Defendant asserted that the 
evidence against him was obtained pursuant to an unreasonable 
search and seizure in violation of his fourth amendment rights 
and principles of collateral estoppel (R. 60). In denying 
defendant's motion to arrest judgment the trial court made 
3 
At the present time the State makes no representation 
concerning the validity of defendant's appellate argument. 
sketchy oral findings on the merits of defendant's substantive 
claim (T3. 12-14; see Addendum B). On appeal to this Court, 
defendant again challenges the trial court's denial of his motion 
to arrest judgment on the ground that the arresting officer was 
obligated to secure a warrant before arresting him and that, as a 
result, the evidence seized incident to that arrest should have 
been suppressed. 
Defendant's argument is properly disposed of on waiver 
grounds. Defendant did not file a motion to suppress either 
before or during trial but instead presented it for the first 
4 
time in a motion for new trial. After his new trial motion was 
denied, defendant again argued that the evidence should have been 
suppressed in a subsequent motion to arrest judgment which was 
similarly denied. Thus, defendant's suppression claim was not 
timely and should not be considered on appeal. £f. State v. 
Webb, 790 P.2d 65, 75 (Utah Ct. App. 1990) (objection raised for 
first time in motion for new trial not timely); Broberq v. Hess, 
782 P.2d 198, 202 (Utah Ct. App. 1989) (appellant cannot for 
first time after trial assert error in a motion for new trial). 
See also Beehive Medical Electronics v. Square D. Company, 669 
P.2d 859, 861 (Utah 1983) (defendant's expansion on grounds for 
objections below in a motion for new trial did not cure the lack 
Rule 12 of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure provides in 
part that the failure to raise motions concerning the 
admissibility of evidence in writing at least five days prior to 
trial constitutes waiver. Utah R. Crim. P. 12(d). Therefore, 
the trial court could have properly refused to consider 
defendant's subsequent motions for new trial and arrest of 
judgment on grounds that the suppression issue upon which 
defendant placed primary reliance had been waived. 
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of timeliness in making proper objections to the trial court). 
Because the record does not indicate that the trial court's 
ruling was an abuse of discretion, the denial of defendant's 
motion to arrest judgment on the merits is not subject to 
reversal. See State v. Williams, 712 P.2d 220, 222 (Utah 1985) 
(trial court's denial of motion for new trial will not be 
disturbed absent clear abuse of discretion). 
It might be argued that a defendant may raise a 
suppression issue in a post-trial motion because Rule 12(d) of 
the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure further provides "that the 
court for cause shown may grant relief from such waiver." 
However, this would be an unreasonably broad reading of that 
provision. Although the trial court heard defendant's 
substantive arguments concerning the suppression issue upon which 
defendant based his motion to arrest judgment, there is no 
indication in the record that the trial court either explicitly 
or implicitly found "cause" to grant defendant relief pursuant to 
Rule 12(d) in this instance. Furthermore, Rule 12(d) should not 
be read to allow a defcmdant who fails to file a motion to 
suppress either prior to trial, or, at the latest, during trial, 
before the disputed evidence is admitted, to show "cause" for 
relief from waiver for the first time in a post-trial motion. 
See State v. DeMille, 756 P.2d 81, 85 (Utah 1985) (defendant 
precluded from raising issue of whether juror was incapable of 
impartially weighing facts and applying law in postverdict 
affidavit after failing to raise issue at voir dire); State v. 
Lairby, 669 P.2d 1187, 1192 (Utah 1984) overruled on other 
grounds, State v. John, 770 P.2d 994, 995 (Utah 1989). 
(defendant's failure to object to the legality of his arrest 
prior to trial constitutes a waiver of that issue). In 
considering the scope of Rule 12(d) it is important to note the 
explicit, limiting language of Rule 12(b)(1) which states ••[t]he 
following shall be raised at least five days prior to the trial: 
. . . motions concerning the admissibility of evidence." Thus, 
Rule 12(b)(1) lends support to the view that a postverdict motion 
5 
to suppress is not timely. 
POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT'S FINDINGS OF FACT ARE 
INADEQUATE TO ALLOW THIS COURT TO 
MEANINGFULLY REVIEW THE ISSUES ON APPEAL. 
Alternatively, should this Court determine defendant's 
claims were timely made, defendant has failed to prepare a 
reviewable record on appeal and this case should be remanded to 
the trial court for additional findings. 
This Court has stated on numerous occasions that 
findings of facts underlying a trial court's decision to deny a 
motion to suppress will not be disturbed on appeal unless they 
are clearly erroneous. State v. Lovegren, 798 P.2d 767, 770 
(Utah Ct. App. 1990); State v. Marshall, 791 P.2d 880, 881 (Utah 
Ct. App.), petition for cert, filed, 135 Utah Adv. Rep. 78 (Utah 
1990); State v. Johnson, 771 P.2d 326, 327 (Utah Ct. App.), cert. 
granted, P.2d (Utah 1989). This Court also has stated that 
Similarly, Rule 103(a)(1) of the Utah Rules of Evidence 
provides that error may not be predicated upon a ruling which 
admits evidence in the absence of a timely objection, stating the 
specific ground of objection. 
_ Q _ 
it can afford a trial court's decision substantial deference only 
when the findings disclose "the steps by which the ultimate 
conclusion on each factual issue was reached." Lovegren, 798 
P.2d at 770 (quoting State v. Marshall, 791 P.2d at 882 n.l). In 
so stating, this Court noted the particular need for detailed 
findings in search and seizure cases because of their highly fact 
sensitive nature. Ld. In Lovegren, as here, the critical facts 
were greatly disputed. There, the failure of the trial court to 
make adequate written or even oral findings left this Court with 
a record that did not "'clearly and uncontrovertedly support the 
trial court's' ultimate decision." IA. at 770 (quoting Acton v. 
Deliran, 737 P.2d 996, 999 (Utah 1987)). This Court noted that 
"[t]hough the decision not to suppress may have been correct, the 
critical issues are for the trial court to decide and . . . the 
findings of fact must reveal how the court resolved each material 
issue.'" Id. (quoting Acton v. Deliran, 737 P.2d at 999). In 
the instant case the trial court's oral findings of fact did not 
meet the requirement foi: specific findings and would not allow 
this Court to meaningfully review the appellate issues. 
The Utah Supreme Court has stated that "[t]he burden of showing 
error is on the party who seeks to upset the judgment." State v. 
Jones, 657 P.2d 1263, 1267 (Utah 1982). Therefore, even though 
remand for the entry of more complete findings is an appropriate 
remedy, notwithstanding the above, this Court could properly 
retain jurisdiction of this case and assume the regularity of the 
proceedings below and affirm his conviction because defendant has 
failed to provide a reviewable record on appeal. Jolivet v. 
Cook, 784 P.2d 1148, 1150 (Utah 1989), cert, denied, U.S. 
, 110 S.Ct. 751 (1990). 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing argument, this Court should 
affirm the ruling below, or, in the alternative, remand this case 
to the trial court for more detailed findings of fact. 
DATED this ^ ^ ^ ^ day of December, 1990. 
R. PAUL VAN DAM 
Attorney General 
~fl1a)ti**A-&£iki/^ 
CAN DECKER 
Assistant Attorney General 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that a true and accurate copy of the 
foregoing Appellee's Brief was mailed, postage prepaid, to 
Kenneth R. Brown, Attorney for Appellant, 10 West 300 South, 
Suite 500, Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 this /Q day of December, 
1990. 
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ADDENDA 
ADDENDUM A 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH 
PLAINTIFF 
VS 
BELGARD, DAYTON JAY 
JAIL 
DEFENDANT 
MINUTE ENTRY 
CASE NUMBER 891900995 FS 
DATE 12/18/89 
HONORABLE RAYMOND S UNO 
COURT REPORTER KEN ALLEN 
COURT CLERK LSN 
TYPE OF HEARING: SENTENCING 
PRESENT: DEFENDANT 
P. ATTY. HUFNAGLE, WENDY 
D. ATTY. JOHNSON, HOWARD 
THIS CASE COMES NOW ON REGULARLY BEFORE THE COURT FOR HEARING 
ON DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR A NEW TRIAL AND SENTENCING. APPEAR-
ANCES AS SHOWN ABOVE. 
BASED UPON ARGUMENTS OF RESPECTIVE COUNSEL, THE COURT ORDERS, 
DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR A NEW TRIAL IS DENIED. SENTENCING IS 
CONTINUED TO JANUARY 31, 1990 @ 9 AM. 
COPY TO AP&P 
ADDENDUM B 
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THE COURT: Well therefs sort of a different 
perspective on why the officer approached the motel room. 
One is that there was sufficient probable cause, and the 
other is that the probable cause was still not established 
at that particular time. Because he was not aware of who 
was in there, how many people were in there, if the people 
who he thought might have taken the car were in there, or 
if they might have been someone else. And based on that, I 
think the state's theory is that he was continuing to 
investigate to determine who occupied the premises, and if 
they were the people who were involved in the theft of the 
vehicle. 
Defendant's theory is that there was sufficient 
probable cause, because the identity of the vehicle was not 
in question, because it's positively identified by the 
state's man, having a peculiar cracked window that 
identified the make of the car and that specific car. 
And listening to arguments of counsel, and then 
briefly reviewing the memorandum filed by both, the court, 
essentially being apprised again of the facts of the case, 
is of the opinion that defendant's motion to suppress at 
this time should be denied, and the court is of the opinion 
that based on the facts of this case, and the evidence that 
was introduced into court, and is essentially recited by 
both memorandums, with some slight differences, is that the 
13 
police officer who was involved in this case here, Officer 
Maxwell, essentially did the things as recited by both 
parties. 
Came to the door, and I believe that this is 
comparable to an essentially a Terry-type situation as 
articulated by the state. The Payton case does show that 
in certain circumstances similar to this that a warrant 
should be secured, because a person's home is sacred under 
the Fourth Amendment, which requires that a warrantless 
search is, per se, unconstitutional unless it fits under 
certain circumstances, exceptions. 
And I believe that the state has carved out an 
exception by recitation of the activities of police officer 
Maxwell in making the investigation, essentially securing 
the premises, knocking on the door, and it's a question of 
his apprehensions and his experience as a police officer 
that gives rise to a Terry-type situation that the state 
has outlined in its analysis. 
I think that when you're on the firing line, you 
have to make certain decisions, and you have to use your 
experience, training, and size up the situation as you 
comprehend it to be. And based on his training and 
experience, he effected the arrest. 
And based on that, in plain view, his testimony 
is that the weapon was seen, and his prior knowledge and 
14 
experience again indicates that that could present a danger 
to anyone to have a weapon thatfs in the possession of a 
person that was involved in a crime, or suspected or 
alleged crime, and that it was known that a weapon was 
offered in exchange for the purchase of the vehicle. 
Whether the weapon was operable or unloaded, I think the 
cases hold, does not make any difference, because that's 
something that the officer himself would not know. So 
based on that, the court is going to deny the motion at 
this time. 
MR. BROWN: Your Honor, in terms of 
clarification, for my benefit more than anyone else's, the 
evidence that the court is relying upon was the evidence 
that was presented in the sole hearing that we had; is that 
correct? 
THE COURT: Right here, right. His testimony 
during the course of the hearing. 
MR. BROWN: The hearing that I was involved in? 
Thank you. 
THE COURT: Anything further? There's a question 
of bail or something like that. 
MR. BROWN: Well, yeah, there was the motion to 
set bail. I don't know if the court wants to consider that 
in view of the court's order. But I did supply the court 
with a motion, and attached to that a self-explanatory 
ADDENDUM C 
KENNETH R. BROWN, Esq., #0458 
BROWN & COX 
Attorneys for Defendant 
10 West 300 South, Suite 500 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
(801) 363-3550 
Tr.-'ri Judici*-... :;i:ict 
MAY J. 1990 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
DAYTON J. BELGARD, 
Defendant. 
ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT'S 
MOTION FOR ARREST OF 
JUDGMENT AND FOR SUPPRESSION 
OF EVIDENCE 
Case No. 891900995FS 
Raymond S. Uno, Judge 
The Court having received evidence on February 21, 1990, 
in connection with the defendant's Motion For Arrest of Judgment 
and For Suppression of Evidence, and the Court having heard the 
arguments of counsel, and after having reviewed the Memorandums in 
support of the parties' various positions, and having considered 
the matter and being fully advised therein, now enters the 
following Order: 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the defendant's Motion for Arrest 
of Judgment and for Suppression of Evidence be and the same is 
hereby denied. 
'day of A ^ V 1990. 
BY THE COURT 
By:. 
DATED this""2^ 
Raymond S. Uno, Judge 
